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CONTACT INFORMATION 
 
This report has been published by: 
European Commission 
Directorate General for Trade.G.1 
200 Rue de la Loi 
1049 Brussels, Belgium 
Tel : +32-2-298-1304, Fax : +32-2-296-7393 
Email : TRADE-G1@ec.europa.eu  
  Contacts: Mr. Matthew Baldwin, Mr. George Cunningham and  
   Mr. Nicolas Hausséguy 
 
  
where any further enquiries or comments concerning this report can be sent. 
 
 
For market access information, economic and regulatory information, applied tariff levels and 
analyses of trade issues, please consult the European Commission’s Market Access 
Database website: 
 
http://madb.europa.eu 
  
 
For an overview of all the U.S.-related fiches in the Market Access Database, please click here. 
 
 
Additional information and updates on EU-U.S. trade relations, as well as this report can be 
found in the "Bilateral Trade Relations" section of the website of the European Commission's 
Directorate General for Trade:  
 
http://ec.europa.eu/trade 
 
Information from the Directorate General for Enterprise and Industry on notifications of 
technical regulations and conformity assessment procedures is available at: 
 
http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/tbt 
 
This report has been compiled by the European Commission’s Directorate General for Trade 
in co-operation with the European Commission’s Delegation in Washington, D.C. and other 
services of the Commission on the basis of material available to them at the end of December 
2006.  
 
This year's Report on U.S. Trade and Investment Barriers is both more concise, while at the 
same time, its scope has been expanded. Through hyperlinks in the report, the reader can 
access specific details of around one hundred U.S. barriers on the European Commission's 
Market Access Database (MADB). This database will be regularly updated.  U.S. Barriers to Trade and Investment Report for 2006 
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EU and U.S. in the World Economy  
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1  EU-US TRADE RELATIONS – A BRIEF OVERVIEW 
This report identifies the key trade and investment barriers in the United States that need to be 
addressed to increase the flow of goods, services and investment across the Atlantic. Such barriers are 
not just damaging to EU companies, but have a substantial negative impact on the U.S. economy and 
consumers as well. There is a need to draw some long-standing disputes to an end and to solve others 
without having to resort to litigation, thereby tackling barriers that impede economic growth. This is a 
big challenge but worthwhile as the potential rewards are great for all. 
 
The EU and the U.S. are each other's main trading partners, accounting for the largest bilateral trade 
relationship in the world. Their economies combined are 58% of global GDP. They account for 37% of 
world trade. EU-U.S. trade in goods and services is worth around EUR 420 billion a year or approx. 
EUR 1.15 billion a day. The total EU and U.S. Foreign Direct Investment in each other's economy is 
valued at approximately EUR 1.5 trillion. This has created close to 14 million jobs on both sides of the 
Atlantic combined. 
 
The size of the bilateral trade relationship means that the EU and U.S. are key players in the Doha 
Development Agenda (DDA). This aims to deepen “rules-based” trade liberalisation and ensure the 
further integration of developing countries into the multilateral trading system. The EU is keen to 
work closely together with the U.S. and other partners in the World Trade Organisation (WTO) to 
bring the Round to a successful close in the narrow window of opportunity that exists until mid-2007. 
 
The 2005 EU-U.S. Summit took the decision to launch the Transatlantic Economic Initiative which 
aims to target some of the key remaining barriers in the transatlantic market: promoting regulatory 
and standards cooperation; stimulating open and competitive capital markets; anti-money laundering 
and terrorist financing cooperation; spurring innovation and the development of technology; 
enhancing trade, travel and security; promoting energy efficiency; supporting effective protection and 
enforcement of intellectual property rights; competition policy; procurement and services. Although 
progress is being made in some areas, this report highlights how much more needs to be done in 
reality – particularly on investment and procurement – for the full potential to be realised. 
 
Despite this effort, a considerable number of impediments in the transatlantic trade and investment 
relationship still need tackling. They range from traditional tariff and non-tariff barriers to differences 
in both sides’ respective legal and regulatory systems. Lack of U.S. compliance with a number of 
World Trade Organisation dispute settlement findings is still a major EU concern. However, 2006 saw 
the successful resolution of or, at least substantial progress in three long-running trade disputes:  
 
•  In February, the US Congress repealed the Byrd Amendment, but stopped short of full 
compliance by introducing a long transition period. To reflect this situation, EU sanctions are 
now being reduced in tandem with remaining Byrd payments. 
•  In March, the EU and the U.S. lifted telecoms procurement sanctions against each other, 
bringing to an end more than a decade-long dispute. 
•  In May, the U.S. repealed the Foreign Sales Corporations/ETI export-contingent subsidy tax 
scheme, including all grandfathering provisions, which had been repeatedly ruled WTO-
incompatible. The WTO had given the EU the right to impose sanctions of up to USD 4 billion 
dollars if the U.S. did not comply with its ruling. This threat of sanctions has been withdrawn.   
 
Even if the economic impact of these trade disputes constitutes only a small proportion of the overall 
EU-U.S. trade volume, they need to be managed adequately. The European Commission remains 
firmly committed to address existing and future obstacles to trade and investment in the U.S. market 
in a constructive way, through agreed bilateral, plurilateral and multilateral channels. U.S. Barriers to Trade and Investment Report for 2006 
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2  EXTRATERRITORIALITY AND UNILATERALISM 
2.1 Extraterritoriality 
The extraterritorial provisions of certain U.S. legislation which hamper international trade and 
investment continue to cause problems for EU companies. Although these issues have been relatively 
quiet in recent years, a number of provisions remain on the U.S. statute book, especially the 1996 
Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (Helms-Burton) Act and the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act (ILSA). 
Although the application of ILSA with respect to Libya was terminated by President Bush in April 
2004, Congress passed the Iran Freedom Support Act in 2006 which extended the provisions of ILSA in 
the case of Iran only for another five years to 2011.  
 
The EU has expressed its opposition to this kind of legislation, or any secondary boycott or sanction 
legislation having extraterritorial effects, through a number of representations and démarches, such as 
the Council Regulation 2271/96 (the so-called "Blocking Statute") of 22 November 1996. Other trading 
partners of the U.S., such as Canada and Mexico, have strengthened or adopted similar blocking 
legislation. 
 
On 14 March 2000, the Iran Non-Proliferation Act (INPA), another example of extraterritorial legislation, 
was signed into law. It allows the U.S. Administration to apply its own sanctions to exports which are 
subject to EU Member State and EU export control regimes, while also unilaterally expanding the 
scope of export controls on EU exports beyond those agreed multilaterally. 
 
Section 319 of the Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept 
and Obstruct Terrorism Act, known as the PATRIOT Act, deals with allegations of money laundering 
and the forfeiture of funds in the U.S. interbank accounts. It  applies extraterritorial provisions to 
financial services. The European Commission is concerned about such allegations and their impact on 
the legal certainty and ability of European banks to conduct business in the U.S.  The Commission is 
working with U.S. Treasury authorities to assess the nature of this problem and, if necessary, how to 
remedy the situation in such a way as to give European banks sufficient legal clarity to conduct their 
business.  
2.2 Unilateralism  
In this context, "Unilateralism" may take the form of either unilateral sanctions or unilateral retaliatory 
measures against “offending” countries or companies. Both types of measures are based on an 
exclusively U.S. assessment of the actions of a foreign country or its legislation and administrative 
practice irrespective of multilaterally-agreed rules. This approach has in the past cast doubt on U.S. 
support for a multilateral rules-based system addressing trade problems. Whilst the U.S. has in 
practice made extensive use of WTO fora, including its dispute settlement system, it has not 
renounced the possibility of taking unilateral trade measures. As a result, the EU has won two WTO 
dispute settlement cases, one against the U.S. suspension of customs liquidation in the banana 
dispute, and one against Sections 301-310 of the Trade Act of 1974. The latter authorises the U.S. 
Government to take action to enforce U.S. rights under any trade agreement and to combat practices 
by foreign governments which the U.S. Government deems to be discriminatory, unjustifiable or 
restrictive to U.S. commerce.  
 
The EU also initiated dispute settlement proceedings against “carousel” legislation (Section 407 of the 
Trade and Development Act of 2000), which the U.S. has so far not applied. The most recent example of 
unilateral action here is the U.S. continued suspension of obligations in the EC Hormones Dispute and 
persisting import duties despite the EU’s removal of inconsistent measures.  U.S. Barriers to Trade and Investment Report for 2006 
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3  TARIFF BARRIERS 
Despite the substantial tariff reduction and elimination agreed in the Uruguay Round, the U.S. retains 
a number of significant duties and tariff peaks in various sectors including food products, textiles, 
footwear, leather goods, jewellery and costume jewellery, ceramics, glass, trucks and railway cars.  
 
Negotiations in the current Doha Development Round have not yet been concluded. The EU’s concern 
is now focused on a relatively limited number of U.S. “peaks” and other significant tariffs where less 
progress has been made. The EU hopes that there will be a substantial reduction of remaining U.S. 
tariffs as an outcome of the current Doha Round.  
 
Concerning multilayer parquet, changing classification by the U.S. Bureau of Customs and Border 
Protection has led to higher tariffs. Although tariffs on optical fibre cables were eliminated under the 
Information Technology Agreement (ITA), the U.S. does not wish to do the same for optical fibres where 
rather substantial protection remains. Tubes for computer monitors are also excluded. Attempts to 
broaden the scope and coverage of products in the form of an ITA II have so far failed.  
4  NON-TARIFF BARRIERS 
Traditionally, the focus of trade negotiations has been on reducing tariff barriers. As they have come 
down, attention has switched increasingly towards non-tariff barriers. These barriers range from 
regulatory inconsistencies across the Atlantic to complex issues such as sanitary and phytosanitary 
measures, state-level impediments and import prohibitions amongst others. Reduction of existing 
regulatory barriers to trade and investment - and preventing new ones emerging - would have a 
positive impact on the competitiveness of EU and U.S. companies and economies.  
4.1 Regulatory Divergences and Barriers 
Regulatory barriers are increasingly recognised as significant impediments to trade and investment 
between the EU and the U.S. A particular problem in the U.S. is the relatively low level of use, or even 
awareness, of standards set by international standardising bodies.  
 
EU exporters to the U.S. market face steep regulatory barriers. In the U.S., products are increasingly 
being required to conform to multiple technical regulations regarding consumer protection (including 
health and safety) and environmental protection.  Although in general not de jure discriminatory, the 
complexity of U.S. regulatory systems can represent an important structural impediment to market 
access as in the case of pharmaceutical approval. Other obstacles for European exporters, such as the 
American Automobile Labelling Act,  documentary and labelling requirements for textiles  as well as 
restrictions regarding the distribution and marketing of wines and spirits refer to regulatory barriers 
in the form of labelling requirements. Concerning pressure equipment, it is not uncommon that 
equipment for use in the workplace is subject to U.S. Department of Labor certification, a county 
authority’s electrical equipment standards, specific regulations imposed by large municipalities, and 
other product safety requirements as determined by insurance companies. Furthermore, conformity 
assessment procedures and testing requirements have proven to be very burdensome for European 
companies.  
 
This situation is aggravated by the lack of a clear distinction between essential safety regulations and 
optional requirements for quality, which is due in part to the role of some private organisations as 
providers of assessment and certification in both areas.  For instance, this is the case for product-safety 
requirements and other standards for electrical and electronic equipment as well as construction 
products. Moreover, for products where public standards do not exist, product safety requirements U.S. Barriers to Trade and Investment Report for 2006 
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can change overnight when the product liability insurance market makes a new assessment of what 
will be required for insurance purposes. Furthermore, U.S. Coast Guard Regulations and technical 
requirements of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) for recreational marine  pose 
considerable technical barriers to the European shipbuilding industry. Differences in standards and 
food safety requirements between the U.S. and the EU are moreover exemplified by the export 
conditions for Grade A milk products as well as provisions for organic products under the National 
Organic Program of 2001. 
 
A more integrated and streamlined transatlantic regulatory environment would have a positive 
impact on the competitive potential of EU and U.S. companies, given the fact that the latter are also 
highly integrated. Reinforced regulatory cooperation is therefore important to help dismantling 
existing regulatory barriers and preventing new ones from arising. Recent efforts include the 
development of the 2002 voluntary EU-U.S. Guidelines for Regulatory Cooperation and Transparency and 
the recent 2005 Roadmap for EU-U.S. Regulatory Cooperation (also see the latest report). Moreover, the 
High Level Regulatory Cooperation Forum  to facilitate regulatory dialogues established by the 
Transatlantic Economic Initiative at the June 2005 EU-U.S. Summit met on two occasions in 2006. 
Although progress is being made by EU-U.S. regulatory cooperation, EU exporters continue to face a 
number of post-import impediments. The proliferation of regulations at State level presents particular 
problems for companies without offices in the U.S. Moreover, the EU-U.S. Agreement on Mutual 
Recognition, in force since 1 December 1998, has not been fully implemented.  
4.2 Registration, Documentation, Customs Procedures 
There is a lack of recognition of the EU as a customs union; the direct consequence is non-acceptance 
of EU certificates of origin by U.S. Customs.  Serious questions are also raised by the reluctance of the 
U.S. Bureau of Customs and Border Protection’s of the Department of Homeland Security (CBP) about 
foreign participation in the Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT) scheme. The cost 
burdens and discriminatory effect on European exporters that arise as a consequence shows this is an 
issue that needs to be addressed within the framework of the Transatlantic Economic Initiative. 
Similarly, the Container Security Initiative (CSI), launched to counter potential terrorist threats to the 
international maritime container trade system, is causing additional costs and delays in shipments 
from the EU to the U.S. Further similar burdens are to be expected from the implementation of the 
2006  Security and Accountability For Every (SAFE) Port Act, and in particular the Secure Freight 
Initiative. The implementation of the food-related provisions of the Public Health Security and 
Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002 (Bioterrorism Act) puts severe burdens on trade in 
food and feed products to the U.S.  
 
The U.S. Code, Title 46, Section 12108 and the American Fisheries Act of 1998 represent considerable 
shipping restrictions for fishermen as foreign-built vessels are not eligible to receive a fishing licence. 
U.S. rules of origin for textiles continue to affect European exports of fabrics, scarves, bed linen, table 
linen, bedspreads as well as quilts containing cotton and wool. 
4.3 State Level Impediments 
There are more than 2,700 State and municipal authorities in the U.S. that require particular safety 
certifications for products sold or installed within their jurisdictions. These requirements are neither 
transparent, nor uniform or consistent with each o t h e r .  I n d i v i d u a l  S t a t e s  a l s o  s o m e t i m e s  s e t  sub-
federal procurement rules going far beyond what is provided for at federal level.  Agricultural and 
food imports, such as restrictions regarding the distribution and marketing of wines and spirits, 
product-safety requirements and other standards for electrical and electronic equipment, are also 
often confronted with additional state-level requirements.  
4.4 Levies, Charges and Import Duties 
EU exports face a number of additional customs impediments, such as import user fees and excessive 
invoicing requirements on importers, which add to costs in a similar way to tariffs. The most U.S. Barriers to Trade and Investment Report for 2006 
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significant user fee is the Merchandise Processing Fee, which is levied on all imported merchandise 
except for products from the least developed countries, from eligible countries under the Caribbean 
Basin Recovery Act, the Andean Trade Preference Act, U.S. FTA partners, or from U.S. Offshore 
possessions. Another significant user fee has been created under the Medical Device User Fee and 
Modernization Act of 2002. Contrary to their U.S. counterparts, Small and Medium-sized Enterprises 
(SMEs) from the EU are unable to apply for reductions and reimbursement of the fees charged.  
 
In a similar way, the Harbour Maintenance Tax is levied in all U.S. ports on waterborne imports at an 
ad valorem rate of 0.125%. In the area of textiles, a specific “cotton fee” is charged to provide money to 
raw cotton producers (for advertisement purposes). In the area of shipbuilding, the U.S. applies a 50% 
ad valorem tax on non-emergency repairs of U.S.-owned ships outside the U.S. (Section 466 of the Tariff 
Act of 1930). The U.S. levies two taxes/charges in particular on the sale of cars in the U.S. Both the 
Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) payment and the so-called Gas Guzzler Tax – which place 
the tax primarily on imported cars – are of concern to European automakers.  
4.5 Import Prohibitions 
The right of sovereign nations to take measures to protect their essential national security interests has 
been widely recognised by multilateral and bilateral trade agreements and, of course, particularly 
since the events of 9/11. However, it is in the interest of all trade partners that such measures are 
prudently and sparingly applied.  Restrictions to trade and investment cannot be justified on national 
security grounds if they are, in reality, essentially protectionist in nature and serve other purposes. 
Under Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, U.S. industry can petition for the restriction of 
imports from third countries on the grounds of national security. The application of Section 232 is 
however not dependent on proof from industry. Consequently, the law provides U.S. manufacturers 
with the opportunity to seek protection on the grounds of national security, when in reality the aim 
can be simply to curb foreign competition. In addition, the chemicals sector is affected by import 
restrictions for certain drug precursor chemicals. Similarly, the Jones Act uses national security reasons 
to prohibit the use of foreign vessels.    
 
In the area of fisheries, the Marine Mammal Protection Act of 1972  establishes  significant  import 
prohibitions. While the EU wholeheartedly supports the protection of marine mammals, particularly 
dolphins; it rejects certain provisions – not directly related to animal protection –which may impede 
trade. 
4.6 Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures  
In the agricultural area, a number of sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) issues remain a significant 
source of difficulty for the EU. Most notable amongst these are the problems encountered in trading 
animal products. For example, U.S. measures are prohibiting imports from the EU of bovine animals 
(based on BSE concerns) and beef. The Veterinary Equivalence Agreement, signed on 20 July 1999, made 
progress in particular regarding the recognition of the animal health status of EU Member States. 
There are promising signs to expedite this recognition process in a near future (Classical Swine Fever, 
Exotic Newcastle Disease, Swine Vesicular Disease) although the full implementation of Article 6 of 
the Veterinary Equivalence Agreement has not been assured yet.  
 
Some of these trade barriers are adversely affecting exports of beef, certain matured pork meat 
products and meat preparations from EU Member States. Also Grade A milk products (milk, cream, 
fermented dairy products, etc) are largely forbidden entry into U.S. territory. The Veterinary 
Equivalence Agreement provides a framework to work towards the recognition of mutual equivalence 
of EU and US sanitary standards in these areas, but the pace of these discussions is very slow. Other 
SPS-related exist for plant health cover imports of fresh fruits, perennials and nursery stock as well as 
standards and certification of ornamental plants established in growing media and propagation 
material (including vitis-wine plants). 
 U.S. Barriers to Trade and Investment Report for 2006 
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U.S. import permits are required for new non-manufactured agricultural products. The time between 
applying and inclusion on the list of approved products can take several years, even when other 
products from the same area of production with the same phytosanitary risks are permitted (this 
concern also applies to the conclusion of Pest Risk Analyses (PRA) by the U.S. authorities). Difficulties 
have been noted for fruits as well as for plants, although they are even more explicit for plants. In 
addition, provisions of the Bioterrorism Act represent a barrier for European imported perishable 
products with a limited shelf life.   
4.7 Public Procurement 
In the field of public procurement, the main U.S. trade barriers are contained in a wide array of clauses 
in federal, state and local legislation and regulation giving preference to domestic suppliers or 
products, or excluding foreign bidders or products altogether. In addition, there are federal 
restrictions on the use of federal grant money by State and local government. These restrictions are 
called “Buy America” (Buy America Act or BAA). Taken together, these restrictions, such as the "Buy 
America" provisions of the Department of Transportation (DoT), cover a significant proportion of 
public purchasing in the U.S. However, as the U.S. International Trade Commission noted in its 2004 
report:  The Economic Effects of Significant U.S. Import Restraints, the complexity and partially 
overlapping nature of existing restrictions make it nearly impossible to determine the total value of 
government-purchased imports subject to these restrictions. Regarding development aid, restrictive 
provisions for U.S. Food Aid purchases and transportation require that at least 75% of tonnage is 
transported on vessels carrying the U.S. flag. Moreover, on a significant number of sectoral issues, 
"Buy American" restrictions are imposed for ball and roller bearings, on electrical and electronic 
equipment and are the legal basis of local content requirements for steel in public procurement cases. 
 
Another practical limitation lies in the lack of transparency related to sub-federal procurement 
opportunities. Unlike the EU - where all tender notices for central and sub-central procurements are 
published on a single electronic site free of charge (the TED data base) - only U.S. federal notices are 
published on a single electronic site (fedbizopps.gov). This situation effectively hinders foreign 
suppliers’ access to sub-federal procurement markets. Potential bidders do not know where to look for 
relevant procurement opportunities and/or information relating to sub-federal purchases.  
 
Despite the fact that the WTO Government Procurement Agreement  (GPA) substantially increased 
tendering opportunities for both sides, the EU remains concerned about the wide variety of 
discriminatory "Buy America" provisions that persist. Small business set-aside schemes, exemplified by 
the Small Business Act of 1953, also limit bidding opportunities for EU contractors. Extraterritorial sub-
federal selective public procurement laws restrict the ability of EU and other companies to do business 
with specific countries if - at the same time - they wish to bid for contracts in various U.S. States and 
cities. There have been further efforts within U.S. Congress to add restrictions to foreign procurement in 
the context of the annual authorisation and appropriations process. Some of the proposed amendments 
raised concerns as to their compatibility with the WTO GPA. 
 
The Department of Defense (DoD) also has significant procurement expenditures that exclude foreign 
suppliers of goods or services. The DoD is the largest public procurement agency within the U.S. 
government, spending billions of dollars annually on supplies and other requirements. Many 
procurements fall under “national security” exceptions to open procurement obligations. The concept of 
“national security” was originally used in the 1941 Defense Appropriations Act to restrict DoD 
procurement to U.S. sourcing.  Now known as the “Berry Amendment”, its scope has been extended to 
secure protection for a wide range of products only tangentially-related to national security concerns. 
There has been a trend towards making the DoD’s other domestic preferences, apart from the BAA, less 
restrictive by expanding them to qualifying countries which maintain reciprocal memoranda of 
understanding (MoU) with the U.S. In practice, all North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) 
countries (except Iceland), all major non-NATO allies of the U.S. such as Australia and New Zealand 
as well as Sweden, Finland and Austria have signed MoUs with the U.S. allowing for a waiver of the 
corresponding restrictions.  U.S. Barriers to Trade and Investment Report for 2006 
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The Commercial Space Act of 1998 applies national security restrictions to space launching services. 
These restrictions, which initially applied to the launch of military satellites, are now also applied on 
national security grounds to satellites for civilian use.  The measures are part of a set of co-ordinated 
actions to strengthen the U.S. launch industry and are clearly detrimental to European launch service 
providers. European operators remain effectively barred from competing for most U.S. government 
launch contracts which account for approximately 50% of the U.S. satellite market. 
4.8 Trade Defence Instruments  
Several U.S. trade defence measures have been brought by the European Union to the WTO Dispute 
Settlement system. Many aspects of U.S. trade defence legislation and practices have already been 
ruled as inconsistent with WTO Agreements. Implementation by the U.S. of these WTO findings has, 
at best, also been slow. 
 
The methodology and application of U.S. trade defence instruments has been challenged frequently 
and successfully - and not only by the EU - in the WTO Dispute Settlement system, such as the laws, 
regulations and methodology for calculating dumping margins (zeroing). As a result, in December 
2006, the Department of Commerce (DoC) published its intention to comply with the WTO ruling 
against zeroing, by changing the methodology itself. However, the U.S. has subsequently delayed 
implementation until 22 February 2007. In addition, it has until 9 April 2007 to implement the WTO 
ruling in 31 specific cases in which the zeroing methodology has been applied. Several other aspects of 
U.S. trade defence legislation and practices, including those relating to safeguards, have been shown 
to be inconsistent with WTO Agreements as well.  WTO rulings against U.S. trade remedies include 
the Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act of 2000 ("Byrd Amendment"). Despite the welcomed news 
of its repeal in 2006, the Byrd Amendment's WTO-incompatible distribution of collected anti-dumping 
and countervailing duties to the U.S. complainants will continue for several more years.  
 
The Antidumping Agreement and the Subsidy and Countervailing Measures Agreement (SCM) contain a so-
called "sunset review". While measures should not last longer than five years unless it is deemed that 
their termination would likely lead to the continuation or recurrence of dumping or subsidisation 
which are causing injury, the U.S. has kept in place many countervailing duty (CVD) orders on 
privatised steel firms dating back as far as 1985, although the subsidies involved have usually expired, 
ceased to exist or are having only minimal impact. In December 2006, the U.S. finally revoked a 
number of these long standing measures; however many other measures still remain in place.   
   
In March 2002, the DoC imposed an anti-dumping duty of 125.77% on imports of stainless steel bars 
from the UK made by Firth Rixson Special Steels (FRSS) Ltd. The U.S. had also enacted anti-dumping 
and countervailing duties on uranium imports from France, Germany, the Netherlands, and the UK in 
2002, which were partially revoked in 2006.  
4.9 Re-Export Restrictions 
A comprehensive system of export controls for dual-use items under the Export Administration Act of 
1979 and the Export Administration Regulations was established to prevent trade to unauthorised 
destinations.  This system, among other things, requires companies incorporated and operating in the 
EU to comply with U.S. re-export controls, including compliance with U.S. prohibitions on re-exports 
for reasons of national security and foreign policy. The extraterritorial nature of these controls has 
repeatedly been criticised by the EU, given the fact that it has active members of all international 
export control regimes: the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the Australia Group, the Missile Technology 
Control Regime and the Wassenaar Arrangement (see Iran Non-Proliferation Act). Several aspects of the 
U.S. encryption control policy also raise concerns. Potential problems are posed by the differential 
treatment of encryption items depending on whether they are transferred to government and non-
government end users. U.S. Barriers to Trade and Investment Report for 2006 
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4.10 Subsidies  
The EU continues to be concerned about the significant direct and indirect government support given 
to U.S. farmers and industry by means of direct subsidies, protective legislation and tax policies. The 
adoption by the U.S. Congress of the Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002 ("Farm Bill") 
increases significantly the trade-distorting effect of U.S. farm subsidies. This Act is clearly inconsistent 
with the express commitments of WTO Members, reinforced at Doha in November 2001, that farm 
policies should be reformed in the direction of less trade distorting forms of support. Closely related 
to the Farm Bill, are the commodity loan programmes with marketing loan provisions for crops like 
wheat, rice, corn, soybeans and other oilseeds. These programmes are administered by the Farm 
Service Agency (FSA) through the Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC). Additionally, several 
agricultural export programmes such as the Export Enhancement Program, the Dairy Export Incentive 
Program and Market Access Program, the Export Credit Guarantee Program (GSM-102) as well as the Food 
Aid Programs provide considerable amounts of subsidies for U.S. farmers  
 
On 12 October 2004, the EU initiated a WTO dispute settlement procedure against a number of U.S. 
federal and state subsidies to Boeing. This action followed the U.S. unilateral withdrawal from the EC-
U.S. Agreement on Trade in Large Civil Aircraft and the initiation of WTO dispute settlement procedures 
against alleged European support for Airbus. U.S. subsidies challenged by the EU in the WTO include 
a USD 3.4 billion package in the State of Washington (combining tax breaks, tax exemptions or tax 
credits), infrastructure projects for the exclusive benefit of Boeing, USD 14.5  billion funding from 
NASA and DoD for aeronautics R&D and a USD 800 million package in the State of Kansas in the 
form of tax breaks and subsidised bonds. WTO panel proceedings in both cases are ongoing, and are 
expected to last until the first semester of 2008. The EU also remains concerned about the significant 
level of subsidies to the U.S. shipbuilding, aircraft engine manufacturers and steel industries.   
 
The EU recognises the severe financial consequences of 9/11 on U.S. airlines and the need to ensure 
that vital transport services in the U.S. are maintained.  Nevertheless, the on-going large scale state aid 
for airlines represents a significant protection from commercial pressures faced by foreign carriers as 
well and is an impediment to fair trade on transatlantic air routes. EU Regulation No 868/2004 allows 
for specific measures to be taken against third countries’ carriers in order to counteract subsidisation 
and unfair pricing practices resulting from such non-commercial advantages. 
 
Transparency in the area of subsidies is an obligation of the Subsidy and Countervailing Measures 
Agreement (SCM). Up to 1998, the U.S. only notified the WTO of a limited number of federal 
programmes – many of which were relatively small – and not its many State-level subsidies.   
However, following pressure from the EU in the form of detailed questions and a counter-notification 
under Article 25.10 of the SCM, the U.S. finally began to notify certain State-level subsidies in its new 
and full notification of 1998. However, the EU still remains concerned by the lack of information on 
U.S. State-level subsidies, particularly large, ad hoc investment incentives. 
5  INVESTMENT RELATED MEASURES 
5.1 Foreign Direct Investment Limitations 
The Exon-Florio Amendment to the 1950 Defense Production Act (Section 5021 of the 1988 Trade Act) and 
subsequent legislation is restraining foreign investment in (or ownership of) businesses relating even 
peripherally to national security. The Exon-Florio provision is implemented by the Committee on 
Foreign Investment in the United States ("CFIUS"), an inter-agency committee chaired by the Secretary 
of Treasury. As the President delegated his authority in this matter to CFIUS in 1988, the committee 
has the authority to block a foreign acquisition of a U.S. corporation on national security grounds. The 
lack of a clear definition of “national security” seems to have led to an overly wide interpretation of U.S. Barriers to Trade and Investment Report for 2006 
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the term by the U.S. The EU recognises that there are security issues to be resolved relating to trade 
and investment, particularly in the aftermath of 9/11, but has long expressed concern about excessive 
use which could be interpreted to be a disguised form of protectionism. Import, procurement and 
investment restrictions, as well as the extraterritorial application of export restrictions are affected.  
 
U.S. restrictions on foreign investment are particularly evident in the shipping, energy and 
communications sectors. Various U.S. laws provide for "Conditional National Treatment" for 
investments of foreign-owned firms, notably in relation to the area of science and technology research. 
Apart from this matter, the EU would like the U.S. to resolve outstanding foreign ownership issues to 
allow the EU-U.S. agreement on aviation services to be brought to a rapid conclusion. 
 
Further investment constraints exist in the telecommunication sector (Section 310 of the 1934 
Communications Act), where U.S. law enforcement agencies have imposed strict corporate governance 
requirements on companies seeking Federal Communications Commission  (FCC) approval of the 
foreign takeover of a U.S. communications firm in the form of far-reaching Network Security 
Arrangements.  
 
Foreign investment is also restricted for coastal and domestic shipping under the Jones Act and the US 
Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, which includes fishing, dredging, salvaging or supply transport from 
a point in the U.S. to an offshore drilling rig or platform on the Continental Shelf.  Non-U.S. investors 
must form a U.S. subsidiary for exploitation of deep-water ports and for fishing in the U.S. Exclusive 
Economic Zone (Commercial Fishing Industry Vessel Anti-Reflagging Act of 1987).  Under the American 
Fisheries Act of 1998, fishing vessel-owning entities must be at least 75% owned and controlled by U.S. 
citizens in order to receive a fishing permit.  Licences for cable landings are only granted to applicants 
in partnership with U.S. entities (Submarine Cable Landing Licence Act of 1921). 
 
Under the Federal Power Act, any construction, operation or maintenance of facilities for the 
development, transmission and utilisation of power on land and water over which the Federal 
government has control, are to be licensed by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission. Such 
licenses can be granted only to U.S. citizens and to corporations organised under U.S. law.   
5.2 Tax Discrimination 
Several aspects of U.S. taxation practices constitute additional difficulties to foreign investment in the 
U.S. market. Those are mainly related to the nature of reporting requirements, conditions for 
deductibility of interest payments and State unitary income taxes. Firstly, concerns about federal tax 
measures' focus for instance on the nature of reporting requirements and the fact that domestic and 
foreign companies are treated differently. Secondly, the so-called “earnings stripping” provisions in 
the Internal Revenue Code 163j and its limits on tax deductibility of interest payments applies relatively 
strict rules that do not necessarily always conform to internationally-accepted principles. Thirdly, the 
EU deems U.S. state-level “world-wide” unitary taxes as inconsistent with U.S. obligations under its 
tax treaties with other countries. 
6  INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 
6.1 Copyright and Related Areas 
Despite a number of positive changes in U.S. legislation following the Uruguay Round, copyright issues 
are still problematic such as authors' moral rights and music licensing exemptions due to Section 110(5) 
of the 1976 U.S. Copyright Act ("Irish Music" case). Despite losing a WTO case on the latter issue, the 
U.S. has not yet brought its Copyright Act into compliance with the WTO Agreement on Trade Related U.S. Barriers to Trade and Investment Report for 2006 
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Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs). The EU has safeguarded its rights to suspend trade 
benefits granted to the U.S. if the Copyright Act is not amended. 
6.2 Appellations of Origin and Geographical Indications 
The continuing misuse of EU geographical indications on foods and drinks produced in the U.S., 
particularly in the wine sector, as well as other food products, is the source of considerable frustration 
for EU producers. There is no protection of geographical indications as such in the U.S. labelling 
regulations and collective trademarks or certification trademark systems are insufficient to give full 
protection. 
6.3 Patents, Trademarks and Related Areas 
Article 31 of the TRIPs Agreement introduced a requirement to inform promptly right holders about 
Government use of their patents. Despite extensive use of patented goods by or for U.S. authorities, it 
appears that U.S. Government departments frequently fail to comply with this obligation.  
 
Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930 provides remedies for holders of U.S. intellectual property rights by 
keeping the imported goods which are infringing on such rights out of the U.S. (“exclusion order”), or 
to have them removed from the U.S. market once they have come into the country (“cease and desist 
order”). In February 2000, the EU and its Member States held WTO consultations with the U.S. with 
no positive outcome on the issue. Since then, the U.S. International Trade Commission (ITC) has 
started new investigations against European companies. The European Commission is concerned by 
these developments and regularly raises Section 337 in its bilateral contacts with the U.S. 
Administration.  
Section 211 of the U.S. Omnibus Appropriations Act of 1998 ("Havana Club") prohibits, under certain 
conditions, the registration or renewal of a trademark that is identical or similar to a trademark 
previously owned by a confiscated Cuban entity. No U.S. Court can recognise or enforce any assertion 
of such rights. According to the Appellate Body report of 2002, Section 211 is in violation of both the 
national treatment and the most favoured nation obligations of the TRIPs. In addition, the advertising 
of low price perfumes which imitate famous European brands and thus benefit from their well-known 
reputation. This practice, while not prohibited in the U.S., may nevertheless represent a violation of 
existing intellectual property rights. 
 
The co-existence of fundamentally different patent systems (the U.S. continuing with its “first-to-invent” 
system whilst the “first-to-file” system is followed by the rest of the world) continues to create 
considerable problems for EU companies, considering high U.S. litigation costs in patent matters. The 
existence of different systems is a shared EU-U.S. problem and there is a need to harmonise the systems.   
However, there have been some initiatives in Congress to reform the patent system by moving toward a 
“first-to-file” system and this can only be further encouraged. In a similar fashion, transatlantic 
differences regarding patents are exemplified by the application of the Hilmer Doctrine in patent 
interference cases, which  has been clearly detrimental to European companies. American and 
European law also take different approaches to the question of patentability of software and business 
methods. Concerning plant variety, U.S. provisions such as the Plant Patent Act do seriously impede 
trade in breeding material for ornamental plants. 
7  SERVICES 
7.1 Business Services 
The implementation schedule of the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) for professional 
services has resulted in some improvement in market access.  However, a number of problems, U.S. Barriers to Trade and Investment Report for 2006 
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especially because of State level regulation, remain to be tackled in order to secure more transparent 
and open access to the U.S. market. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, adopted as a reaction to U.S. 
corporate scandals, has had a significant impact on U . S . - l i s t e d  E U  c o m p a n i e s ,  a s  w e l l  a s  o n  E U  
auditing firms, which could face conflicting laws on audits and corporate governance. 
 
In the area of free movement and business contacts, the EU considers the current U.S. visa non-
reciprocity regime as a particularly serious barrier to trade and investment which can in some cases 
cause harm to the competitiveness of EU companies. 
7.2 Communication Services 
The GATS Basic Telecommunications Agreement, in force since February 1998, has led to significant 
commitments on market access. Nonetheless, the EU remains concerned about the substantial barriers 
that EU and foreign-owned firms still face (e.g. investment restrictions, lengthy proceedings, 
conditionality of market access, and reciprocity-based procedures). Section 310 of the 1934 
Communications Act established restrictions to foreign investment in U.S. companies holding a 
broadcast or common carrier radio licence. There are also limits to foreign indirect investment 
although subject to a public interest waiver. The U.S. Administration and the Federal 
Communications Commission (FCC) consider that this waiver provision is sufficient for the FCC not 
to apply Section 310(b) (4) of the 1934 Communications Act to WTO Members. This situation, however, 
does not provide certainty to European operators. In addition, FCC regulations for digital terrestrial 
television and digital audio broadcasting also negatively affect European companies, and EU-based 
satellite communications operators have experienced difficulties accessing the U.S. market. 
 
Furthermore, the reduction in the number of competitors in the wire line sector, notably as a result of 
mergers, coupled with an extremely litigious environment raises some concerns and will require 
particular attention to ensure a fair and non-discriminatory access offer, in particular to guarantee last 
mile access to customers, a reduction of competition in the internet backbone market leading to “de-
peering”, as well as dominance and packet-discrimination concerns. 
7.3 Financial Services 
There are continued difficulties in operating conditions for financial institutions on both sides of the 
Atlantic. Evidence of widespread corporate malfeasance, financial misinformation, and violation of 
conflicts of interest rules has prompted a significant overhaul of elements of the U.S. regulatory 
system. While welcomed in principle, the reform of elements of U.S. Congressional law on company 
accounts and corporate governance (Sarbanes-Oxley Act) contains elements which could potentially 
require EU entities to infringe their domestic obligations, as well as increasing the cost for EU issuers 
of capital raised in U.S. markets. The international banking community continues to voice concern 
over the requirement to maintain "asset pledges" (capital equivalency deposits), in addition to the 
paid up capital they maintain in their home country, of the Office of the Comptroller of the 
Currency (OCC) and some State banking supervisors. Much of the focus of EU-U.S. discussions in 
the field of financial regulation over the past three years has been to find pragmatic and mutually 
satisfactory solutions to ensure that provisions of the U.S. law do not have unintended consequences 
for activities of EU established entities and vice-versa.  
 
In general, recognition of equivalence of home-country standards for capital and banking markets 
would significantly reduce the regulatory burden of firms and financial institutions that are active on 
both sides of the Atlantic. Additionally, the current requirement for non-U.S. reinsurers to post 100% 
collateral for their U.S. acceptances is both discriminatory and technically unjustifiable in the modern 
age. The EU welcomes the moves towards re-examining this system but will need to see that such 
moves are also implemented in practice in all U.S. states. 
 
Concerns relating to access to U.S. financial markets frequently centre on the extent to which 
compliance with U.S. regulatory provisions is a proportionate or justified condition for providing U.S. Barriers to Trade and Investment Report for 2006 
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financial services directly to U.S.-domiciled investors or counterparties. EU financial institutions are 
already subject to comparable and demanding authorisation and supervision in Europe. Several 
regulations of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission for foreign securities firms represent 
substantial barriers for the establishment of branches or subsidiaries.  
 
These concerns gain currency as remote trading and investment strategies are already being 
implemented on a transatlantic basis. EU and U.S. authorities have agreed on the need for informal 
mechanisms to support enhanced information flow and upstream discussions on new regulatory 
initiatives. Since 2002, the EU-U.S. Financial Markets Regulatory Dialogue has been tackling existing 
issues of concern and acting to prevent new ones from emerging). Financial services negotiations in 
the framework of the GATS are also particularly important. In this context, the EU is working to 
improve access of European financial institutions to U.S. markets in a number of key sectors. 
Unfortunately, the U.S. has not so far offered major new commitments in financial services. A 
permanent and MFN-based agreement entered into force in March 1999 and GATS negotiations on 
financial services were re-launched in Geneva in 2000. 
7.4 Transport Services 
With regard to air transport, the EU and U.S. are seeking to conclude a first-stage comprehensive air 
transport agreement that would significantly reduce barriers concerning market access.  The EU also 
aims, through this agreement, to address foreign ownership limitations and FAA restrictions 
regarding leasing of foreign aircraft. Measures adopted on aviation security since 9/11 as well as the 
large scale governmental financial assistance provided to U.S. airlines are issues that also need 
addressing. Section 1117 of the Federal Aviation Act requires that, in general, transportation funded by 
the U.S. Government (passengers and cargo, mail is covered by separate legislation) must be 
performed by U.S. carriers.  By contrast, in the EU, any obligation for government officials to use 
“national flag” is considered to be anti-competitive.  
 
The Merchant Marine Act of 1920 (Jones Act) prohibits foreign-built vessels from engaging in (direct or 
indirect) coastal trade and cannot be documented or registered for dredging, towing or salvaging.  In 
addition, there has been no progress on the elimination of requirements that U.S. Government-owned 
or financed cargoes be shipped on U.S.-flagged ships. U.S. maritime security legislation (such as the 
Container Security Initiative and the Secure Freight Initiative) is of EU concern, since it could result in 
discrimination between ports of WTO Members as to the way in which cargo containers are 
processed. In addition, the U.S. has not included any maritime services-related commitments within 
even its most recent Doha WTO Round services offer of May 2005. 
 
Whereas the U.S. advocates further liberalisation from other countries on express deliveries, barriers 
to its market remain significant, in particular those concerning air transport. On 16 April 2003, an 
amendment to the Wartime Supplemental Appropriations Act barred airlines which are not effectively 
controlled by U.S. citizens or 50% of whose turnover derives from foreign companies from the benefits 
of certain military budget appropriations, which have in effect deprived them from State Department 
and Department of Defense contracts.     U.S. Barriers to Trade and Investment Report for 2006 
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